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 XX. THE TERM. "COMMUNAL"
 I. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMUNAL ORIGINS
 The period following the French Revolution was deeply
 interested in "the people" as a mass conception, in all that
 belonged to them and all that they created. It was in this
 period that theorists on the origin of law, customs, religion,
 language, literature-particularly the folk-song and the folk-
 tale-liked to advocate the doctrine of spontaneous, unconscious
 growth "from the heart of the people," as the phrase went.
 Such conceptions of origin had their critics from the first;
 but they remained more or less orthodox throughout the nine-
 teenth century, and they still have foothold in both England
 and Ameiica. They have, however, receded in the wake of
 more reserved second-thoughts about human nature, along
 with the recession of the "romantic" vehemence, and of the
 Hegelian philosophy of the "over-soul," and of our own dema-
 gogic admiration of the undifferentiated demos.
 In law, for a first illustration, the theory of the German
 jurist, Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) remained en-
 trenched pretty much throughout the century. Savigny's
 theory may be summarized in a few sentences:'
 Yet we are not at all to think of it [the common la,w] as such in the sense
 that the several individuals who compose the people have produced it by an
 exercise of their will; for this will of the individuals might perhaps sometimes
 bring forth the same law but might also, perhaps, and with more likelihood
 bring forth very diverse laws. It is rather the spirit of the people [Volksgeist]
 living and working in all individuals that gives rise to the positive law; which,
 therefore is not a matter of chance for the consciousness of each individual but
 is necessarily one and the same law for each . . . This feeling [of the internal
 necessity which goes with the recognition of positive law] is expressed with
 most positiveness in the ancient assertion of a divine origin for law or for
 enactments; for one could not conceive of a more distinct denial that law origi-
 nates by chance or through human will.
 In other words, law is something that grows by sheer power
 of unfolding itself in men's miscegenated conscious states.
 About 1878 R. von Ihering attacked this doctrine with his
 theory of law as a conscious product of men seeking to achieve
 I System des h6utigen rdmischen Rechts (1840), I, ? 7.
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 social ends, and Savigny's theory was gradually dropped in
 continental Europe. By the end of the nineteenth century, it
 was practically given up everywhere except in England and
 America.
 A further illustration may be drawn from the history of
 theories concerning the origin and growth of language. Jacob
 Grimm thought of language as something born from the soul of
 primitive society. Savigny was Grimm's teacher, and as laws
 were to Savigny, so language was to Grimm, unmistakably of
 social emergence. His successors retained this view of language
 as a social product, though they offered explanations of the
 sources of human speech which were more concrete than
 Grimm's. A distinction, deriving from Grimm's view, arose
 between the "artificial" products of the individual and the
 spontaneous creation of the people. Professor Paul was a
 dissenter.2 He emphasized the part played by the individual,
 and believed in an artistic rather than a social genesis for
 language. In the main, however, language continued to be
 viewed, as it was by the psychologist Wundt, as a product of
 the communal mind. Characteristic is the position of an
 American scholar, writing as late as 1891, in advocacy of "The
 Festal Origins of Human Speech." The psychologist, he says3:
 . . .can trace the root back to the rhythmic sounds that savages produce
 when they beat sonorous bodies amid the play-excitement which originated
 through communal elation of the success of communal action, and which had
 become, at the earliest glimpse which we obtain of it, involved, like the oldest
 and most sacred of the words it gave birth to, in the race's traditional custom
 of festal celebration.
 At the opposite extreme from these theories is the view of
 Professor Otto Jespersen. He suggests in his recently published
 Language (1922)4 that:
 [The first utterances were] exclamative, not communicative-that is, they
 came forth from an inner craving of the individual without any thought of any
 fellow creatures. Our remote ancestors had not the slightest notion that such
 a thing as communicating ideas and feelings to some one else was possible . .
 Although we now regard the communication of thought as the main object of
 speaking, there is no reason for thinking that this has always been the case;
 it is perfectly possible that speech has developed from something which had no
 2 Principien der Spralchgeschichte (1886), ch. i.
 3 J. Donovan, Mind, vol. VI, pp. 498-506.
 4 See pp. 432-442. See also his earlier Progress in Language (1894).
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 other purpose than that of exercising the muscles of the mouth and throat and
 of amusing oneself and others by the production of pleasant or possibly only
 strange sounds.
 The first utterances of speech he fancies to himself as
 "something between the nightly love-lyrics of puss upon the
 tiles and the melodious love songs of the nightingale," i.e., he
 puts forward a doctrine which is neither "festal" nor "com-
 munal."5 He also points out that to ensure the creation of a
 speech which shall be a parent to a new language stock, all
 that is needed is that two or more children should be placed by
 themselves in a condition where they will be entirely or to a
 large degree free from the presence or influence of their elders.'
 Professor Jespersen goes back to individuals. He does not rely
 upon the "mentally homogeneous throng," either for the origin
 of human utterance or for the creation of new language stocks.7
 I Professor Jespersen is right, I think, in detaching primitive musical utter-
 ance from inevitable association with the dance. Edward Sapir (Language,
 1921, p. 244) repeats-rather unthinkingly, I believe-the old view that
 "Poetry is everywhere inseparable in its origins from the singing voice and the
 measure of the dance." Poetry and song are inseparable in origins; butprimitive
 musical utterance appears (like the songs of birds or of children) independent
 of the dance, as well as associated with it, as far down in the cultural scale as
 we can go.
 6 Following the American ethnologist Hale, "Tbe Origin of Language,"
 in Transactions of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
 vol. xxxv, 1886, etc. See Jespersen's Language, p. 181.
 7A parallel shift of theory may be seen in the fields of economics, anthro-
 pology, and sociology. For example, a belief prevailed, as advocated by Sir
 Henry Maine, E. de Laveleye, and other scholars, that the existing institution
 of private property is a direct descendant of a system of communal ownership-
 much as Professor Gummere thought individual authorship and ownership of
 song to be the direct descendant of communal authorship and ownership. A
 late reflection of Maine's view may be found in The Evolution of Revolution,
 by H. M. Hyndman (1921), who writes at the opening of his first chapter
 ("Primitive Communism"): "All authorities are agreed that, throughout the
 earlier development of mankind, communism, without any private property
 whatever in the means of creating wealth, prevailed as an economic and social
 order" . . . "Private ownership in any shape which gave its possessor economic
 or social -power over his fellows, was unknown." Hyndman speaks in his
 introduction of "the most crucial revolution in the story of human growth"
 . . . "This revolution was the transformation from collective or communal
 property held by a portion of a tribe or gens, by the tribe itself, and ultimately
 by a confederation of tribes, into private property held by the individual and
 his family."
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 Alongside the early nineteenth century conceptions of the
 growth of law and language belongs Herder's collectivistic
 conception of the origin of popular poetry, which his disciple,
 F. A. Wolf, afterward applied to the Homeric poems. For
 literature, too, communal inspiration was advocated. The
 belief became orthodox that primitive peoples and other
 mentally homogeneous groups created their songs in public, in
 a sort of communal spontaneity. Just as for language, a
 distinction was insisted upon between "art" poetry, coming
 from the individual, and "folk poetry," arising from the people.
 Among English dissenters, Joseph Jacobs remarked that there
 is no such thing as the folk behind what one calls folk tales,
 folk lore, popular ballads.8 William Wells Newell, founder and
 first president of the American Folk-Lore Society was another
 dissenter from the doctrine of folk-origins or folk creation.
 But the view of these men did not become the accepted view.
 "We search for poetry before the poet,"9 said a leading scholar.
 "Poetry of the people is made by any given race through the
 Some recent studies of the subject of primitive ownership appear to show
 that the communistic theory is mythical, not only for private property but for
 the ownership of land. Completer investigation makes clear that individualistic
 ownership both preceded and followed common control and ownership. This
 is the thesis of Jan St. Lewinski (The Origin of Property, Lectures delivered
 at the London School of Economics, 1913) who maintains that individual
 ownership was always the first form of property . . . "from a state of no
 property, individual ownership generally originates once labor has been in-
 corporated in the soil" (p. 22). Pure nomads and hunting peoples have no
 private property in land, but land is not common 'property among them.
 It is merely a free good, to appropriate which is not worth the trouble. The
 evidence of existing primitive peoples, says Lewinski, shows clearly that the
 village community was not the primitive stage but was preceded by individual
 appropriation. "Thus the principal pillars of the communistic theory are
 already demolished!" he writes (p. 30). Private property in personal effects,
 like clothes, weapons, domestic animals (in songs, also, it might be added)
 prevails everywhere, it appears, even among the peoples lowest in the cultural
 scale, and it has probably existed from time immemorial. For a recent American
 book, taking the same position as Lewinski's, see Robert H. Lowie, Primitive
 Society (1920), chapter IX.
 8 "Yet when we come to realize what we mean by saying a custom, a tale,
 a myth, arose from the Folk, I fear we must come to the conclusion that the
 said Folk is a fraud, a delusion, a myth.... The Folk is a name for our
 ignorance." Folk Lore, iv, 234, June, 1893.
 9 F. B. Gummere, "The Ballad and Communal Poetry," Harvard Studies
 and Notes in Philology and Literature, V, 55.
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 same mysterious process which forms speech, cult, myth,
 custom, or law."'"
 At the present time, however, continental Europe, from which
 the doctrine of communal inspiration emerged, has given it up.
 Its strongest remaining foothold is in the United States, the
 country into which the doctrine last entered.
 The whole theory of a communal mind from which emerged
 law and institutions and from which on festal occasions are
 (or were) born language and literature rests upon the romantic
 enterprise of sociologists, who thought to write a psychology of
 men en masse apart from any sane reliance upon the analysis of
 individual minds-very much as if one were to endeavor to cut
 a physical robe foi mankind as a whole with no thought of
 individual arms and legs. This effort issued in the bizarre
 belief in a collective soul which is not to be found in the nature of
 the souls of the individuals which compose the social group, but
 which in some mystic sense enwraps the individuals in its all-
 obscuring fog. Such a "communal mind" or "mob mind" or
 "'gesammtgeist," as you may choose to call it, has no actuality
 which science or sense can observe. If history and indeed
 ethnology betray clearly one fact it is that there is no such
 "'mental homogeneity" among men. As a critical hypothesis the
 whole communal prepossession has led mainly into misconcep-
 tion and misvaluation; its service (for service of a sort it is)
 has been to arouse an interest and an industry in its support
 which have only succeeded in demonstrating its futility. In
 other words, it is honorably shelved by its own inability to
 stand the test of substantial evidence.
 But in this connection it ought to be in place to point out that
 there is another and classical concept in criticism which might
 well have its value restored. The consensus gentium, meaning
 the critical agreement of instructed opinion, is an idea which in
 law underlies all theories of government which proceed ex
 communi consensu and in the arts is regarded by Aristotle and
 Longinus as well as by the best of Renaissance critics as the
 securest anchorage of valuations in matters of taste." It is
 10 Old English Ballads, p. xxxvi. For a recent German view, taking the
 contrary position concerning the genesis of folk-song, see Alfred Gotze, Vom
 Deutschen Volkslied, 1921.
 11 The argument from universal consent (consensus omniumn gentiusm) is
 formulated by Aristotle at the very beginning of the Topics (i, 1): "As for
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 needless to point out that such a conception is poles remote from
 the romantic Volksgeist figment. Where the "mob soul" calls
 for the play of unconsciousness, the classical consensus calls for
 deliberate and trained conscious effort; where "communalism"
 seeks formlessly to express feeling, the consensus judges (as
 Rousseau has it) in the "calm of the passions";'2 and where the
 probable truths, they are such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality
 of men, or by wise men; and among these last either by all the wise, or by the
 generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."
 The argument, however, was especially adopted by the Stoics, whose literature
 it pervades, and given Latin form by such Stoic writers as Cicero (cf. De
 Natura Deoruin, i. 17; ii. 2); and Tubsculanae Dispitationes i. 15: ("quod si om-
 nium consensus vox naturae est") and Seneca. Bacon, with the example of
 excessive deference to the authority of Aristotle before him, remarks: "Verus
 enim consensus is est, qui ex libertate judicii in idem conveniente consistit"
 (Instauratio Magno, Pars II, Liber i, Aph. lxxvii). As used in criticism, the
 evidence of the consensus of trained minds is regarded as especially valid as the
 natural answer to the mediaeval maxim, de gustibus et coloribus non est dis-
 putandum; and it is, in fact, the bulwark of any theory of sound criticism in art
 and letters. Here again the foundation of the idea is in Aristotle,-both in the
 Politics and the Poetics, especially Chapter XXVI of the latter work, where he
 defines the higher art as in every case that which appeals to the better auditor, or
 the cultivated spectator (OEam's EbMEIKoS); see, also, Butcher, Aristotle's Theory
 of Poetry and Fine Art, Ch. IV). But the locus classicus of the idea, in this
 critical sense, is without doubt Longinus, De Sublimitaite vii, where he defines
 the true test of elevation in letters as the judgment of a man of intelligence,
 versed in letters: 'true beauty and sublimity please always and please all.'
 Compare also Courthope, Life in Poetry, Law in Taste, I. Of course, in all this
 the judicial rather than the creative mind is in regard; but can there be any
 valuable creation without selective judgment? Can art, in other words, begin
 without at least the impulse of conscious intention, as the mob-soul theories
 imply that it does? Perhaps if the phrase "work of art" were refocussed in
 critical thought, with right emphasis upon the wor,k, we should have less vogue
 of sociological puerilities and more respect for the classics of critical theory.
 12 In the first version of the Contrat Social (Livre I, Chapitre II) Rousseau
 says: "que la volonte gennrale soit dans chaque individu un acte pur de l'en-
 tendement qui raisonne dans le silence des passions sur que l'homme peut
 exiger de son semblable, et sur ce que son semblable en droit d'exiger de lui, nul
 n'en disconviendra." In view of the fact that to no light degree upon Rousseau
 has been fathered the whole chute of modern thought which has ended in the
 mire of sociological mysticism, it is of no small interest to note how pains-
 takingly intellectualistic Rousseau intended to be. No doubt his "moi commun"
 is in part at least the hapless progenitor of our modern Vollsgeister, communal
 selves, and mob souls; but when (De l'economie politique) he employed the
 analogy of an animal body to define the functions of the body politic, and
 likened the life of the whole to a "moi commun," he was actually on classical
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 primitivist seeks to replace human thought by dancing puppets
 the critic of the tradition endeavors to single out, from the
 midst of puppetdom, creative human intelligences. Obviously,
 conscious effort, cool judgment, and creative intelligence are
 gifts of men, not of mobs; and it was perhaps too much to
 expect from a romantic century interest in these qualities.'3
 II. THE TERM "COMMUNAL" AND FOLK-SONG
 Although the doctrine of communal inspiration played a
 large role during the nineteenth century in theories of the
 growth of law and language and of other human institutions, the
 word "communal" itself was little used in many of these fields.
 It came into the foreground chiefly in anthropology, sociology,
 psychology, and literature.'4 In American criticism, the term
 ground and employing a Platonic figure. It is worth while, however, to point
 to a very interesting alteration of phraseology between the first draft and the
 final form of the key passage to the Contrat Social which of itself appears to
 indicate that Rousseau half feared the very misinterpretation which his phrase
 has been given. He defines the terms of the theoretical contract: "Chacun de
 nous met en commun sa volonte, ses biens, sa force, at sa personne, sous la
 direction de la volonte generale, et nous recevons tous en corps chaque membre
 comme partie inalienable du tout." He then, in the first form, continues: "A
 l'instant, au lieu de la personne particuliDre de chaque contractant, cet acte
 d'association produit un corps moral et collectif, compose d'autant de membres
 que l'assemblee a de voix, et auquel le moi commun donne l'unit6 formelle, la
 vie et la volonte." In the final version the last phrase is altered to "lequel
 [corps moral et collectif] reCoit de ce m6me acte son unite, son moi commun, sa
 vie et sa volonte." The subordination of the "moi commun" is obviously the
 intention of the change. Of course Rousseau never dreamed of the "over-
 individual ego" or of the "blind will" of a psychic underworld which were later
 to miscolor critical judgment.
 13 I am indebted for assistance in my examination of material from the fields
 of law, sociology, and philosophy to my brother, Dean Roscoe Pound of the
 Harvard Law School, to J. E. Le Rossignol, Professor of Economics at the
 University of Nebraska, and especially to H. B. Alexander, Professor of Phil-
 osophy at the University of Nebraska.
 14 The word communal is as old as the Song of Roland (uit en sunt communel,
 in the sense of tous y prennent part, 1. 475, cited by Littr6). Later it usually
 denotes what has to do with a commune. As a critical term in English it belongs
 to the nineteenth century. Impetus was given to commune after the title was
 assumed by Parisian political desperadoes during the Reign of Terror. The
 word communal entered English through French influence, early in the century,
 in the sense of pertaining to a commune. By the middle of the century it was in
 use in the sense of pertaining to a community.
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 has its most frequent use in connection with discussions of
 traditional ballads. Its currency has not derived from Pro-
 fessor Child, who preferred "popular." Professor Child speaks
 of "popular" ballads and "popular" origins. It was introduced
 by Professor Francis B. GummereU6 in his edition of the Old
 English Ballads (1894). When seeking for a differentiating
 epithet for the English traditional ballads he writes:16
 As a mere makeshift, however, one might use the word "communal." A
 communal ballad is a narrative ballad of tradition which represents a community
 or folk, not a section or class of that community, and not a single writer.
 If, after introducing the term, he had employed it always in
 this sense, his usage would better bear examination. But he
 soon went far beyond this original definition. He came to
 employ the word not only for denoting what "represents" a
 community and does not come from a single hand, but for
 what a community as over against an individual has created, on
 social occasions. He makes spontaneous communal creation,
 not gradual re-creation by a succession of singers, a test of
 origins. Folk-poetry originates communally, he affirms,
 artistic poetry is created by individuals. His disciples have
 continued his usage; and by our own time the term has become
 pretty firmly entrenched in textbooks and literary histories.
 Few American scholars write of folk poetry in these days withou t
 relying upon the word.
 The following are some conceptions associated with the
 term "communal" which I think invalid. It seems probable to
 me that they will eventually be given up in America, as they are
 now abandoned in continental Europe.
 1. It is no more a demonstrated fact that poetry had com-
 munal origin than it is that language had such origin, or law, or
 u Behind his employment of "communal" lay German influence. He wished
 to make for English a distinction similar to that afforded by Franz B6hme's
 volkslieder and volksthi4mliche lieder (Liederbuch, 1877). Gummere's "communal
 mind" suggests Wundt's volksseele, or his gesammtgeist. He may also have had
 in mind Steinthal's dichtender volksgeist, or Lachmann's gemeinsames dichten.
 He comments on these terms at some length in the introduction to his Old
 English Baallds, and in "The Ballad and Communal Poetry," in the Child
 Memorial volume of Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature.
 Otto Immisch (Die innere Entwickelung des griechischen Epos, 1904) coins the
 name Gemeinschaftsdichung.
 'eOld English Ballads, p. xxvii.
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 that property was originally owned in common. Assumptions
 like Professor Gummere's "The original ballad must have been
 sung by all as it was danced by all,"'7 or "Poetry was a com-
 munal product," are assumptions and nothing more. Investiga-
 tion of the song of primitive peoples shows that primitive
 song is not always danced; that primitive lyrics are not narrative
 and hence should be termed songs not ballads; and that they
 are not necessarily nor even preponderatingly of social inspira-
 tion. Communal inspiration should no longer be over-insisted
 upon for primitive song. Songs composed by individuals and
 songs sung by groups of singers are found among the most
 primitive of living races. The conception of individual song
 can be shown to exist among the very lowest peoples. That in
 the earliest stage there was group utterance merely, arising
 from the folk-dance, and that individual composition came
 later is fanciful hypothesis. The communal authorship and
 ownership of primitive poetry as over against culture poetry is
 largely a myth.'8 "Communal" inspiration of poetry is true in
 the same sense in primitive as in civilized communities and
 only in the same sense.'9
 2. It is also erroneous to assume that peasant communities
 originate their own ballads or narrative songs. The product of
 folk-improvisation is not typically the ballad but the song, and
 17 Old English Ballads, p. lxxxvii.
 18 The best instance of communal composition among the Indians which I
 can cite is the following, which was recently brought to my attention. The
 paragraph is from Frances Densmore's "Northern Ute Music" (1922) p. 26, a
 volume issued as Bulletin 76 of the Publications of the American Bureau of
 Ethnology.
 Composition of Songs.-It was said by several singers that they "heard a
 song in their sleep," sang it, and either awoke to find themselves singing it
 aloud or remembered it and were able to sing it. No information was obtained
 on any other method of producing songs. In this connection the writer desires
 to record an observation on musical composition among the Sioux. A song was
 sung at a gathering and she remarked: "That is different from any Sioux song
 I have ever heard, it has so many peculiarities." The interpreter replied,
 "That song was composed recently by several men working together. Each
 man suggested something and they put it all together in the song." This is the
 only instance of cooperation in the composition of an Indian song that has been
 observed, adds Miss Densmore.
 l8Evidence supporting this and the following generalizations has been
 presented by me in various articles published in the Publications of the Modern
 Language Association, Modern Language Notes, etc.
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 song so produced is the most ephemeral type of song. The
 folk improvise largely to familiar airs.20 They do not create
 their own melodies, and especially not on the spur of the
 moment. They make over, or add stanzas to, or somehow
 manipulate, something already in existence. The typical
 products of folk-improvisation are the lampoon, the satire, the
 adaptation. This was well illustrated by the improvisations of
 groups of singing soldiers during the recent war. It has often
 been pointed out that in the Southern Appalachians exist
 isolated communities, unlettered and cut off for a hundred
 years from traffic with the rest of the world; and these com-
 munities still entertain themselves with traditional song.
 Conditions are ideal for the creation of communal ballads,
 according to the orthodox theory. Yet their investigators have
 not found that they have any body of song of their own creation,
 whether pure lyrics or ballads. They still sing the English and
 Scottish ballads brought over by their ancestors.2" Self-created
 songs about their own life are conspicuously wanting. The
 Southwestern cowboys perhaps live as communal a life as any
 in our period; possibly they are more literate than the moun-
 taineers, but they are little more creative. The bulk of their
 songs entered their circles from the outside world. Where
 they have songs concerning themselves, they are fitted to
 familiar melodies, and (at least the songs which have value or
 memorableness) are adaptations of already existent material.
 The best cowboy songs, having claim to originality, may be
 traced to minor poets. The cowboy songs which are nearest to
 genuine communal creations are those of weakest quality, are
 not narrative, and are in character most ephemeral.22
 20 The extent to which old airs are preserved is quite astonishing. Many of
 our current hymns and popular songs are set to century-old melodies-originally
 made for songs of quite another character.
 21 See Olive Dame Campbell and Cecil J. Sharp, English Folk Songs from the
 Southern Appalachians, 1917.
 A critic who has recently reaffirmed belief in the emergence of the English
 and Scottish ballad type from the unschooled peasantry is Professor G. H.
 Gerould, Mod. Philol. xxi, August, 1923.
 21 The orthodox contemporary American conception of the spontaneous,
 gregarious composition of the English and Scottish traditional ballads, on social
 occasions, may be imustrated by the familiar picture (Introd. to the Cambridge
 edition of the English and Scottish Ballads, 1904) of a plausible method of
 composition of "The Hangman's Tree," or of some remote ancestor of it, by a
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 3. Another familiar doctrine that needs qualification or
 rejection is the doctrine that "communal" ("traditional" is the
 better term) preservation of a song brings improvement in the
 narrative quality of the song. This is a fundamental belief
 with Professor Gummere, and on it he bases his theory of
 origins. It is true that there is sometimes improvement in
 scattered instances. Ballads both gain and lose in oral trans-
 mission. When a later text of a song in popular tradition is
 compared with the original text, the dramatic quality is often
 found to be enhanced by the omission of stanzas and of links in
 homogeneous group; or, to go to a more recent book, by the picture of the
 composition of "Sir Patrick Spens" in Greenlaw, Elson, and Keck's Literature
 and Life, Book I, p. 237 (1922):
 " .... imagine that you are one of a group of people who have been
 powerfully moved by the tragic fate of Sir Patrick. You knew him or some of
 his men. In this group the tragedy is being discussed. One man says he heard
 that Sir Patrick suspected the hand of an enemy, but that he was too brave to
 draw back even though he knew that the voyage meant death. Another says
 that an old sailor observed portents and omens and promised a tragic outcome.
 A third adds that such omens ought never to be disregarded. Others wonder
 how the wives and sweethearts of the dead sailors felt when they heard the news,
 and they speak of the unutterable sadness of their waiting at home, for tidings.
 And at last some one speaks of the dead men themselves, lying down there
 fifty fathoms under the sea, their dead eyes open, their bodies gently rolling
 from side to side with the motion of the water, or too far below the surface ever
 to move. You see you have, in reality, a succession of broken bits of talk,
 expressions of mood, not a story told in an orderly way or written up for the
 newspaper. One member of the group and then another adds his bit. There
 are moments of silence between. All are thinking of the horror, and deeply
 moved. Then perhaps one, or two, or three, begin to put the thing into words.
 The words fit some simple song that everyone knows. The group begins to
 sing the song. The ballad is born.
 Thus the ballad seems not to be a story at all but just the expression of the
 feelings of a whole group of people. It differs from the story in that it seems to
 tell itself. It is not the work of an author who gives to the events an interpreta-
 tion or who carefully chooses details so that a definite impression is built up in
 the mind of the reader. It expresses the reactions of a group. It is impersonal.
 It is a tale telling itself."
 There is a conspicuous lack of evidence for the typical composition of ballads
 in such a way, anywhere, or at any time, even among primitive peoples; and it
 it is difficult to show that it is a method of composition that is psychologically
 plausible. Yet nearly all the available ballad anthologies for schools (see W. D.
 Armes, xxxviii ff.; Neilson and Witham, xv and footnote; G. H. Stempel, xxvii
 ff., etc.) paint for their readers this manner of composition for the English and
 Scottish ballads.
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 the story and the retention only of what is absolutely essential.
 There may also be gain in compactness, in singableness, and in
 concreteness of diction. A few examples have been cited to the
 present writer by the British collector of folk-song, Cecil J.
 Sharp, where the melodies of songs have improved in popular
 preservation. And occasional instances can be brought up, as
 already remarked, where individual texts show improvement.
 But, as a principle, the doctrine does not hold. Individual
 texts may grow better here and there for a time, especially in
 the mouths of superior singers. But a single text of a ballad is
 not the ballad itself. While one text is improving another may
 be degenerating. Professor Child was right when he said that
 the ballad is at its best "the earlier it is caught and fixed in
 print."23 And in the long run, even the text which has improved
 falls into decay. A traditionally preserved text is not static, and
 there is no permanent incorporation into its multiple variants, of
 improvements which may arise. At best there is betterment,
 through so-called communal preservation, only for sporadic texts
 and for a limited extent of time. The typical process, for the
 great majority of traditional ballads is a process of decay.
 4. The belief that the pattern or technique of the English
 and Scottish ballad derives from a pattern set in remote times by
 a singing dancing throng improvising communally is all that
 remains among certain thinkers of the nineteenth century
 communal theory. But even this remainder of that theory
 does not deserve the support which it receives. The refrains,
 salient situations, repetitions and commonplaces of style
 appearing in many ballads (these are the features which are
 traced to primitive times) need no such prehistoric derivation;
 nor are they such fundamental differentiae of the ballad tech-
 nique as is commonly assumed. They are easily to be accounted
 for in the same ways as for other species of folk-song exhibiting
 them which are not termed ballads. The songs of primitive
 groups improvising on festal occasions and the ballads appearing
 in historic times among civilized peoples do not belong in the
 same framework, and they should be kept distinct. Taken
 down in a straight line to modern times, the songs of primitive
 23 See W. M. Hart, "Professor Child and the Ballad," P. A?. L. A. XXI
 (1906), 770, 805, etc.
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 festal groups bring us, on the improvisation side, to modern
 folk-improvisations, like those of singing soldiers, not an extinct
 type of folk-song, though not one of much frequency nor one
 bringing very valuable product. Taken down to historic times
 on the movement side, the primitive group songs bring us to
 the ring-dance or movement or game songs which still exist
 among us, songs in which the refrain is the essential feature.
 But neither of these varieties of folk-song, the group improvisa-
 tion song or the dance or game song centering about a refrain,
 is identical with the story-song or ballad, and neither variety
 develops into the ballad. The narrative song is an independent
 lyric type, and it first appears, not among primitive peoples, but
 in historic times and among civilized peoples. All races,
 primitive or civilized, have folk-songs, but not all have an
 important body of ballad poetry. The richness in ballads of
 the popular poetry of England and Denmark is not typical
 but unusual.
 5. Further, it is surely time that definition of the lyric species,
 ballad, as "of communal composition" should be given up.24
 At least, such composition should be brought forward as hypo-
 thetical, not as a demonstrated fact. It is not a valid assump-
 tion, even for that single species of ballad, the traditional folk
 ballad. Remarks such as Professor Gummere's "A ballad
 must be the outcome and expression of a whole community
 and this community must be homogeneous"24 are not warranted
 by the evidence. This homogeneity is a myth. It is a myth for
 mediaeval times, as Chaucer realized when he differentiated the
 types of tales which he placed in the mouths of the Canterbury
 pilgrims. Even in Anglo-Saxon England, with its clearly
 marked class divisions of ax6elingas, eorlas, ceorlas, ltas, ieowas,
 there was no time when "society from king to peasant" had
 identical interests. And even the songs of primitive peoples do
 not originate as "the outcome and expression of the whole
 community." It is also misleading to associate the term "com-
 munal" invariably with the ballad, ignoring other lyric species
 which deserve the term (however they may have originated)
 far more than does the ballad, i.e., hymns, labor songs, student
 24 Old English Ballads, p. xxvii. A recent critic who reaffirms belief in the
 homogeneous throng and communal origins is Professor H. S. V. Jones, Jouwnal
 of English and Germanic Philology, vol. xxii, January, 1923.
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 songs, game songs. The term has attached itself to ballads;
 yet it should not be emphasized as something which dif-
 ferentiates ballads. Indeed, those who discuss ballads are
 much given to confusing several kinds of song which properly
 should be carefully distinguished. These kinds are: (1) Folk-
 improvisations, a type of verse which appears among all peoples,
 at all stages of development, from primitive gatherings to folk-
 gatherings (like those of soldiers) in our own day.25 But this
 type of verse is not very durable or very important. The
 product of the folk-improvisations of the illiterate, in particular,
 has been rated far too high; (2) Genuine traditional game or
 ring-dance songs, or dance songs proper, like those (many of
 them once danced to by grown-ups) traditional in children's
 games; and (3) Lyric-epics, or ballads proper, a type appearing
 in England some centuries after the Norman Conquest and
 attaining its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
 It is partly because folk-improvisations lack story form, and
 because genuine dance songs of traditional preservation aye not
 narrative, that such origin is to be doubted for the English and
 Scottish lyric-epics collected by Professor Child. According
 to all the evidence to be found, neither folk-improvisation nor
 folk-dancing has ever produced narrative song, or any other
 kind of song which is worth much poetically.
 6. Lastly, even when we speak of "communal re-creation"
 rather than communal creation of ballads, we are using the
 term without real accuracy. There is re-creation by individual
 hands of songs in popular tradition, but is this truly "com-
 munal?" One singer in a community makes one set of changes,
 another makes another set. Indeed the same singer does not
 always sing a song in the same way, or with the same words.
 The changes are not the product of a gesammtgeist. There is no
 communal text; there are many shifting texts in the mouths of
 many singers. The term "communal" is without real validity
 even when we use it, not of the creation of ballads, but of their
 re-creation or modification.
 25 Here, and not under the classification "ballads," belongs the "Hinkie
 Dinkie" of Mr. Atcheson L. Hench ("Communal Composition of Ballads in the
 A. E. F.," Journal of American Folk-Lors, vol. 34, p. 386).
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 The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding considerations
 is that, on the whole, literary historians and makers of text-
 books, would do well to give less conspicuous place to the now
 hopelessly misused term "communal" in discussions of balladry
 and folk-song, in the hope that this omission might generate in
 them a new temper when theorizing concerning poetic origins.
 They should also cease to derive the ballad from the "homo-
 geneous throng" whether of mediaeval peasantry or of primitive
 tribes. A doctrine of inspiration which is now discarded in
 other fields should not linger with belated tenacity in literary
 criticism. Professor Child exhibited characteristic soundness of
 judgment when he preferred the terms "popular" and "tradi-
 tional"-by far the safer terms- and when he remarked of the
 English and Scottish ballads that "a man and not a people
 has composed them," and that "the ballad is not originally the
 product or the property of the common orders of people."26
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